Herding in Middle Eastern Frontier Markets: Are Local and Global Factors Important? by Demir N. & Solakoglu M.N.
3
Handbook of Frontier Markets. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809200-2.00001-4
Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Chapter 1
Herding in Middle Eastern 
Frontier Markets: Are Local 
and Global Factors Important?
N. Demir†, M.N. Solakoglu
Bilkent University, Department of Banking and Finance, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey
Chapter Outline
1 Introduction 3
2 The Empirical Model 7




Herding may be simply defined as copying the behavior of other investors inten-
tionally or unintentionally (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). Although herding 
can lead to market inefficiencies, for the individuals themselves herding behav-
ior can be assumed to be rational (Hwang and Salmon, 2004). The question of 
why some investors/traders disregard market fundamentals in equity markets 
and follow what others do (Borensztein and Gelos, 2000) still remains open 
to discussion, despite evidence in the literature that herding is, in fact, an im-
portant type of investment behavior typical in developing markets rather than 
advanced ones. Theories and empirical research on herding have not seemed to 
converge yet on a generally accepted norm and computation. Hence, there is no 
generally accepted method that separates investor behavior due to herding or 
reaction to fundamentals (Hwang and Salmon, 2007).
There are different approaches to testing for herding, which can be classi-
fied into two groups. One group of studies focuses on explaining the behavior 
of investors—either institutional or private—in following the actions of oth-
ers, a phenomenon which can be classified as rational when such investors are 
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 following the majority or a group of investors who may be perceived to have ac-
cess to better information (Oehler and Chao, 2000; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; 
Kim and Sias, 2005; Puckett and Yan, 2007).
The second group of studies employs a “market-wide” approach, focusing 
on the cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) of dispersion of returns (Chris-
tie and Huang, 1995) and the cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) of re-
turns (Chang et al., 2000). Hwang and Salmon (2004) focus on the dispersion of 
beta coefficients instead of returns. Cross-sectional convergence or divergence 
of returns under extreme market conditions (Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang 
et al., 2000) assumes implicitly that investors’ behavior is based on total risk: mar-
ket risk as well as firm-specific risks. In contrast, Hwang and Salmon (2004) focus 
on beta coefficients, given that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) accounts 
only for market risks. Assuming that herding is an outcome of unobserved inves-
tors’ sentiment rather than market fundamentals, Hwang and Salmon (2004) use 
a state–space model to reveal herd behavior in the market empirically. Put simply, 
they assume that sentimental herding is proportional to the deviations of the true 
and unobserved betas from the unity; that is, the market beta. Hence the biased 
betas may follow certain dynamic paths, either converging toward (herding) or di-
verging from (adverse herding) the market beta depending upon investors/traders’ 
sentiments, given the economic, political, and social environment.
In this study, we look for sentimental herding in four Middle Eastern frontier 
markets: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. All of these countries are mem-
bers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In general, we can assume that 
investors/traders in these markets work with limited market information, and 
specifically lack firm-specific information on financial outcomes beforehand. 
Moreover, while there is some degree of openness to foreign investors, this 
comes with some limitations on market information and tax status.
The Middle East has been experiencing major political instability since the 
launch of the so-called Arab Spring. Markets within the region cannot possibly 
escape the likely impacts of the turmoil brought about by political and social 
events such as the Syrian Civil War,a the Egyptian military intervention,b the 
ongoing unrest within Iraqi borders, as well as the volatility of the oil prices that 
are vitally important for the regions’ economies. Middle Eastern stock markets 
have been considerably instrumental in mobilizing regional resources (eg, oil 
revenues) and are becoming more and more integrated with international mar-
kets, though not as fast as one might expect, given their potential. Markets are 
relatively new, not fully open, shallower, and smaller in size in terms of mar-
ket capitalization relative to fully developed global markets. Investors/traders 
in the region either seem to be skeptical about, or isolated from, the social and 
political unrest, or lack information on significant events because of policies 
intentionally pursued to keep markets away from shocks, which may have de-
a. The International Committee of the Red Cross has judged the fighting in Syria to be a “civil war.”
b. Called either the “Egyptian revolution” or the “Egyptian coup d’état” by proponents and op-
ponents, respectively.
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stabilizing consequences. We learn from earlier empirical studies that markets 
in the region suffer (despite the efforts of modernization) from an information 
asymmetry problem, restrictions on foreign capital, issues with tax status, and 
sharp reversals in oil prices. Thus it is likely that investors/traders are not fully 
aware of market fundamentals, or even if they are, they ignore them and instead 
prefer to follow what others do.
The number of studies about Middle Eastern stock markets has grown rap-
idly in the last decade, due mostly to rising petroleum prices (returns) and their 
volatility, as well as the destabilizing effects of the political uprisings in the 
region. Research about this region aims at:
l Finding evidence of herding and what factors contribute to herding (El-Shiaty 
and Badawi, 2014; Hammoudeh, 2012; Balcilar et al., 2013a; Demirer and 
Ulussever, 2011).
l Interdependence among markets (Assaf, 2003; Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 
2007).
l Integration and interactions between markets (Yu and Hassan, 2008; 
Ravichandran and Maloain, 2010; Cheng et al., 2010; Bouri and 
Yahchouchi, 2014).
l The association of markets with oil prices (returns) and volatility (Ajmi 
et al., 2014; Maghyereh and Al-Kandari, 2007).
l The impact of political and global shocks on regional stock markets (Chau 
et al., 2014).
For example, based on a sample of the 20 most-traded stocks and returns 
dispersion, El-Shiaty and Badawi (2014) find no herding in the Egyptian stock 
market. Hammoudeh (2012) detects herding in the extreme return volatilities 
for all GCC countries except Qatar. Demirer and Ulussever (2011) find herd-
ing based on returns dispersion in some of the Middle Eastern markets and 
conclude that oil prices are the driving force for herding behavior. Balcilar 
et al. (2013a), working with a dynamic model in the GCC countries, find 
(among other things) that herding in these frontier markets can be explained 
by global financial systematic risks. On the interdependency and integration 
of markets, Assaf (2003) finds that GCC stock markets are interdependent and 
that Bahrain plays an especially dominant role. He adds that the markets of 
the GCC are not fully efficient in processing regional news, especially con-
cerning asymmetric information. Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) conclude 
that Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) markets are beginning to 
move toward international financial markets and point out that, in the region, 
Israel and Turkey are the most promising markets, followed by Egypt and 
Jordan. They also find in their later work (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008) 
that MENA markets are more noticeably emerging markets than the markets 
of other emerging regions, such as Latin America and Eastern Europe, but 
that they lag behind Asian emerging markets. Yu and Hassan (2008), Ravi-
chandran and Maloain (2010), and Cheng et al. (2010), looking at integration 
among Middle Eastern markets and with global markets, as well as the impact 
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of global markets on Middle Eastern markets, conclude that integration is 
limited. Similarly, Chau et al. (2014), studying the impact of the Arab Spring 
on stock market volatility in MENA stock markets, conclude that there is 
little evidence that MENA markets, in the aftermath of the political uprising, 
are integrated with international markets. Interestingly, they also pointed out 
that financial asset prices are driven by political events as well as by com-
mon financial and economic factors. Bouri and Yahchouchi (2014) observe 
that MENA markets are interconnected by their volatilities through spillover 
effects, not by their returns. Finally, Ajmi et al. (2014) report significant in-
teraction between oil prices and MENA stock markets. However, the findings 
on the impact of oil prices and/or returns on the region’s markets are not 
unanimous. Some find significant links between oil and stock markets (Basher 
and Sadorsky, 2006; Maghyereh and Al-Kandari 2007). Others find no direct 
effect or no significant impact of oil prices on stock markets (eg, Hammoudeh 
and Nandha, 2007; Khalifa et al., 2014). For example, Choi and Hammoudeh 
(2006) study the responses of five stock markets in the GCC to three global 
factors, including that of the WTI (West Texas Intermediate) oil spot-price 
index, and find that changes in oil prices have no direct effect on these GCC 
markets. On the other hand, Hammoudeh and Nandha (2007) work with a 
sample of 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but find that only the stock 
markets in the Philippines and South Korea are sensitive to oil price changes. 
Still others refer to oil prices and/or returns as the underlying driving forces 
for herding behavior wherever they are detected (Demirer and Kutan, 2006; 
Tan et al., 2008; Balcilar et al., 2013b).
We contribute to the existing literature on herding by searching for answers 
to the following two specific questions: (1) have investors/traders in the four 
Middle Eastern frontier stock markets engaged in sentimental herding? and 
(2) have region-specific and global events affected herding in markets in which 
herding has been revealed? Answers to these questions are important because 
herding in the market can lead to mispricing of assets and bias views about 
returns and risks (Hwang and Salmon, 2004), and the presence of herding can 
be destabilizing and induce excess volatility in the financial markets as well as 
create price bubbles (Patterson and Sharma, 2007). Given that studies on herd-
ing in the region cited previously all focus on return dispersions, it is tempting 
to isolate sentimental herding based on the dispersion of betas (Hwang and 
Salmon, 2004, 2007).
It has been observed that generally people in the Middle East behave in 
an emotional manner and in particular than those who are not sufficiently in-
formed about market fundamentals can be expected to herd, as they feel (per-
haps instinctively) that they should be doing what others are doing. In other 
words, they may be looking for safety in cases in which they expect better 
outcomes by imitating others instead of relying on their own judgment. The 
root cause of herding, based on returns dispersions wherever detected in the 
region, is reported to be a problem of ignorance or asymmetric information 
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and other factors, such as shocks from oil prices (Assaf, 2003; Lagoarde-Segot 
and Lucey, 2007; Balcilar et al., 2013b; Demirer and Ulussever, 2011). In this 
study, we also assume that beta-based sentimental herding in the market is 
practiced by those who face an information asymmetry problem and are anx-
ious about signals received from the financial, political, and even social en-
vironments: simply, they prefer free riding (Truman, 1994; Kallinterakis and 
Ferreira, 2014) because the information comes at no cost of and there is no 
time-consuming effort involved in making decisions. In support of this argu-
ment there is recent and rather strong evidence (Solakoglu and Demir, 2014), 
at least for the Turkish stock market (the BIST), that uninformed investors/
traders of the second national market show significant sentimental herding in 
contrast to the well-informed investors in the BIST 30 (an index covering the 
country’s top 30 corporations). Hence a model such as that of Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) may explain regional investors/traders’ behavior better and 
reveal unobserved sentimental herd behavior, if it in fact exists. As we men-
tioned in the introduction, the Middle East has been a pressure cooker, with 
recent turbulence brought about by popular uprisings, some of which have 
ended—such as the military takeover in Egypt—and with the consequences of 
some still continuing—such as the civil war in Syria and the unsettled internal 
struggle in Iraq. The political instability since the inception of the Arab Spring 
is likely to have affected markets within the region. Moreover, several studies 
cited previously point out the widespread impact of not only those political 
events but also oil prices on stock prices and herding in the region. The sample 
of markets studied constitutes less than 2% of the US market in market capi-
talization. In terms of market capitalization, Qatar is the largest market (close 
to 150 billion US dollars) and Oman is the smallest (around 30 billion US 
dollars). As for the relative size, or market cap/GDP, Qatar ranks first (about 
111%) and Oman last (about 38%).
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empiri-
cal model, Section 3 describes the data and presents the findings, and Section 4 
provides conclusions and some policy implications.
2 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
The hypothesis of Hwang and Salmon (2004) emphasizes the sentimental herd-
ing behavior of investors, a phenomenon which is unobservable and moves in 
association with the systematic risk indicator beta. They also use the cross-
sectional behavior of assets, similarly to Christie and Huang (1995). However, 
given the focus of the CAPM, their model is different, as it assumes the notion 
of market-wide herding based on betas emphasizing the systematic risk, rather 
than the systematic and idiosyncratic risks, associated with returns. In market-
wide herding, an investor may decide to follow other investors, and this may 
cause the individual asset returns to move in tandem with the market returns. 
As the sentiments of the investors vary, the beta values of the stocks will also 
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change from their constant initial values and will confine themselves to the mar-
ket beta of unity.
The model, which is based on a relationship between observed biased beta 
β( )imtb  and unobserved true beta (βimt) is as follows:











imt mt imt (1.1)
where E r( )t
b
it  is the biased short-run conditional expectation for the excess re-
turns of asset i at time t (omitting the country subscript for simplicity), and 
E r( )t mt  is the conditional expectation for the market excess return at time t. The 
unobserved herd behavior indicator hmt  is a parameter assumed to be propor-
tional to the deviation of individual true beta from market beta, or unity. The 
cross-sectional variation of βimtb  is:
β β= −Std Std h( ) ( )(1 )c imtb c imt mt (1.2)
And for the logarithms of Eq. 1.2, we get:
β β[ ]  = + −Std Std hln ( ) ln ( ) ln(1 )c imtb c imt mt (1.3)
We may now rewrite Eq. 1.3 as:
β µ  = +Std Hln ( )c imt
b
m mt (1.4)
where µ β( )=  Stdlnm c imt  is an assumed constant in the short run and 
= −H hln(1 )mt mt . Hwang and Salmon (2004) now allow herding, Hmt, to follow 
a dynamic process AR(1), and the system becomes:
β µ  = + +Std H vln ( )c imt
b
t mt mt (1.5)
ϕ η= +−H Hmt m mt mt1
where the two error terms, σ 2v ~ iid(0, )mt mv  and η σ η2~ iid(0, )mt m , respectively, 
and the cross-sectional standard deviation for each month t and an n number of 

















The two equations in Eq. 1.5 constitute the standard state–space model, or 
Model 1. One of the key parameters of interest in Eq. 1.5 is the variance of the 
error term of state equation σ ηm2 . When σ ηm2  is zero, it would imply that there is 
no herding, as Hmt = 0 for all t. A statistically significant value of σ ηm
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m, provided |m|≤1, would support the autoregressive process AR(1). Hwang 
and Salmon (2004) further tested the robustness of their model by including 
both market volatility and market returns in the signal equation of the model. 
They argued that if Hmt becomes insignificant after the inclusion of these mar-
ket fundamentals in the model, then changes in βStd ( )c imtb  can be explained by 
market fundamentals rather than by herding. Model 1 can therefore be modified 
to include the following fundamentals:
β µ θ σ θ( )  = + + + +Std H ln r vln c imtb m mt c mt c mt mt1 2 (1.6)
ϕ η= +−H Hmt m mt mt1
where ln σmt and rmt represent log market volatility and return in time period t. 
The two equations in Eq. 1.6 constitute Model 2.
Our focus is on the dynamics of the herding parameter, hmt = 1 − exp(Hmt), 
where Hmt is the latent state variable assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Once 
empirical estimates of the herding parameters are derived, one question that 
immediately follows is whether sentimental herding occurs within the domestic 
market only; that is, is sentimental herding a country-specific behavior, or is it 
also associated with other markets (Hwang and Salmon, 2004)? A simple test 
would be to check the significance of the correlation coefficients of herding 
scores among markets. Another question is what factors (such as global events, 
oil prices, and region-specific political events) explain changes in hmt in each of 
the markets in which sentimental herding is detected. Given the time frame 
of the data considered in this study, we hypothesize that shock events—such 
as the mortgage crisis, the Syrian Civil War, the Egypt political intervention, oil 
returns, and volatilities in returns—constitute significant factors in explaining 
sentimental herding within the region. The multiple regression equation em-
ployed is as follows:
α α α α
α α
= + + +
+ + +
h D D D
r SD vln( )
mt
ht
0 1 crisis 2 Syr 3 Egypt
4 oil 5 oil
 (1.7)
where σ 2v ~ iid(0, )ht vht . For the mortgage crisis, Dcrisis = 1 for the months dur-
ing 2007–08, but is otherwise “0,” for the Syrian Civil War, DSyr = 1 from the 
beginning of Mar. 2011 through the end of the sample period, but is otherwise 
“0,” for the Egyptian military intervention DEgypt = 1 from Jul. 2013 to Jul. 
2014, when the presidential election ended, but is otherwise “0,”c roil is the 
log of world Brent oil price returns; and ln(SDoil) is the log of the standard 









c. Ex-president Mubarak resigned in Feb. 2011. Inclusion of this event in the multiple regression 
model as a dummy variable resulted in no significant impact on the herding scores in any market, 
and therefore the event was excluded from the model.
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3 DATA AND FINDINGS
The datad used for the analysis are the daily log of returns obtained from 
Datastream database, including national indices and stock prices covering 
roughly 30,000 daily observations. The range of data differs from market to 
market. Beta estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method and based on the market model using daily data over monthly intervals. 
Returns on stocks and markets average close to zero, and are mildly skewed to 
the left with no excess kurtosis for all markets. The coefficients of variations 
reflect the relative risks in the region’s markets, which may be explained by 
the relatively small size and immaturities of the markets, a feature that underlies 
regional markets in general. The descriptive statistics indicate that βStd ( )c imtb  is 
significantly different from zero for all markets. The Jarque–Bera statistics for 
normality clearly suggest that the distributions of βStd ( )c imtb  for the markets in 
the study are not Gaussian. However, the log of the CSSDs does not seem to 
deviate significantly from Gaussianity—there are significant reductions in the 
values of Jarque–Bera statistics.
Table 1.1 presents the Kalman-filter estimates of the state–space model 
(Model 6) for the four frontier markets. The findings may be summarized as 
follows:
1. When market returns and return volatilities are inserted (Model 6), the 
parameters of Model 5 continued to be highly significant for two of the 
Stdc(βimtb)
Stdc(βimtb)
TABLE 1.1 Estimation Results for Sentimental Herding (Model 6)
Parameters
Herding detected No herding
Kuwait Qatar Bahrain Oman
µm −3.126** −3.568** −2.077** −2.713**
m 0.915** 0.797** 0.822n 0.438n
σmη 0.044** 0.046** 0.000n 0.0203*
σmv 0.011** 0.446** 0.144** 0.044**
Market ret. −21.01** 8.72n −12.678n −19.589n
Market vol. 0.521** 0.552** −0.430** −0.512**
σmη/SDLnβ % 5.20 8.20
Log-lik. 13.32 −61.02 −54.775 −6.951
Akaike −0.12 1,193 0.996 0.259
Highly significant, **; significant, *; insignificant, n.
d. See Table 1.2 for data coverage.
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markets—Kuwait and Qatar—whereas the key parameters m (the persis-
tence indicator) of AR(1) and σ ηm2  (the variance of the state equation) were 
insignificant for the remaining two frontier markets: Bahrain and Oman. 
These findings provide evidence to conclude that sentimental herding has 
occurred in two of the markets— Kuwait and Qatar—but not in the other 
two markets—Bahrain and Oman. It appears that the driving forces for sen-
timental herding in the region are factors other than market category. The 
only answer we can speculate about at this stage is that investors/traders in 
these markets are generally small and medium in size, act individually, and 
make decisions in line with what others do, even if markets are open widely 
to international markets with modern facilities. Simply, the problem may 
be of size. Another reason that may underline herding in these markets may 
be the mixture of stocks that are Shariah compliant and those that are non-
compliant. We speculate that the heterogeneity of investors/traders due to 
religious restrictions imposed on stocks may be the driving force for herding 
or not herding.
2. The persistence parameters—that is, the autoregressive coefficient of the 
AR(1) process—range between 0.797 for Qatar and 0.915 for Kuwait, and 
all are highly significant.e This indicates that of the variance in Hmt, for 
the Qatar market 64% is explained by a 1-month lag of Hmt, while for the 
Kuwait market the explained variance is 84%. This is important because our 
sample of data indicates that herding dies out more quickly in Qatar than in 
Kuwait when market equilibrium is restored.f
3. Market return is highly significant with a negative sign in Kuwait, but not 
significant in Qatar. It appears that returns diminish beta dispersion and 
hence explain some of the contraction in beta dispersion not counted as 
herding.
σmη2
e. The square of this parameter with AR(1) is like the R-squared in regression. For example, for 
Qatar it is 0.7972 = 0.64.
f. Interestingly, the persistence parameter found for the Turkish stock market BIST is even high-
er at 0.973, and highly significant (Demir et al., 2014), indicating that investors/traders in the 
BIST give up herding after a much longer duration than the average of the sample markets in 
this study.
TABLE 1.2 Data Coverage of Sample Countries
Month–year range Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar
Begins Jan. 2004 Jan. 2004 Nov. 2005 Jan. 2005
Ends May. 2014 Feb. 2014 May. 2014 May. 2014
No. of months 122 122 100 110
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4. Market risk (return volatility) is highly significant with a positive sign in 
both Qatar and Kuwait. The beta dispersion appears to be driven also by 
market risk in both markets.
5. The signal ratios range between 5.1% for Kuwait and 8.20% for Qatar. They 
all indicate that sentimental herding has been mild in the two markets over 
the period studied.
6. We should also point out that the Akaike information criteria of Model 6 
(with robust tests) for each market was smaller than that of the base solu-
tions (Model 5), reflecting the fact that inclusion of the market returns and 
volatilities improve the explanatory power of the models.
Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 show line charts of sentimental herding for the two markets 
(Kuwait and Qatar) in which herding was revealed. Inspection of these chart 
patterns, along with the regression results in Table 1.3, gives a better under-
standing of how global and region-specific events affected herding scores. The 
charts show that sentimental herding was mild in Qatar (swings between +0.2 
and −0.3) but more volatile in Kuwait (swings between +0.4 and −0.3). The 
signal ratios (Table 1.3) ranging between 5.1% and 8.2% generally confirm the 
smooth herding patterns.
FIGURE 1.1 Herding pattern for Kuwait.
FIGURE 1.2 Herding pattern for Qatar.
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As for the regression results, our overall assessment is that while herd-
ing in the Kuwait market was significantly influenced by the mortgage crisis 
and the two major region-specific events, herding in the Qatar market was 
affected by the dynamics of the oil market, rather than the global crisis and 
regional events (Table 1.3). One explanation of why the Qatar market was 
not affected by the mortgage crisis may be Qatar’s opennessg to the flow of 
news and market information, and hence its higher degree of awareness of 
developments in international markets. It is widely known that the mortgage 
crisis brought about a mass outflow of foreign funds from developing mar-
kets in general, but in particular from frontier and emerging markets, with the 
deterioration in their financial markets. However, given the fact that Middle 
Eastern financial market investors/traders do not invest in derivative markets 
in significant amountsh and are generally individual investors with little in-
vestment in mortgage-linked stocks, a ruinous impact from the crisis was not 
expected. It appears that the crisis amplified the herd behavior for Kuwait, as 
the respective coefficient is positive and significant. It seems that investors/
traders in the Kuwait market, contrary to those in Qatar market, were not 
ready for or conscious enough about the avalanche of the global crisis be-
forehand, and hence the mortgage crisis was a sudden unexpected shock to 
them “…in the sense that nobody was sure where the market was heading” 
(Hwang and Salmon, 2004). Hence investors/traders not knowing what to do 
turned to the fundamental values of firms, through adverse herding, as a result 
of which asset prices reverted back to the long-term risk-return equilibrium. 
TABLE 1.3 The Effect of Local and Global Factors on Herding
Variables Kuwait Qatar
Mortgage crisis 0.082 (0.037)** −0.039 (0.017)
Syrian Civil War −0.233 (0.040)** 0.036 (0.028)
Egypt’s Coup D’état 0.159 (0.063)** −0.052 (0.044)
Oil returns −0.026 (0.034) −0.054 (0.025)**
Oil return volatility −0.011 (0.020) −0.033 (0.015)**
Adj. R-square 0.306 0.125
No. of observations 122 110
Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
Highly significant, **α=0.01; significant, *α=0.05; insignificant, no script.
g. Qatar’s market cap/GDP is 111%, and the Qatar Investment Authority had an agreement with 
NYSE Euronext, which established a world-class exchange for Qatar.
h. Kuwait’s market, which was hit by the mortgage crisis, is one of the few exchange markets in the 
Middle East to have equity derivatives traded.
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This phenomenon boils down to the simple fact that investors/traders who are 
small and medium in size and yet constitute the majority in these markets had 
little or no access to market information at a time when it was most needed, 
and hence they were confused when the shock occurred.
Looking now at the political front, the Syrian Civil War, which start-
ed with small protests in Syria in Jan. 2011 and turned into mass protests 
against the government in Mar. 2011, has been continuing so far with inten-
sified fighting between the Syrian army and the so-called Free Syrian Army 
and its allied forces. While Syria is suffering harsh effects from the dete-
rioration of its economic and social life, the question of security within the 
region is serious and its impact on the region’s stock markets is worthy of 
investigation. From the regression estimates of Table 1.3, we see that herd-
ing in Kuwait is significantly linked to the conflict in Syria and the Egyptian 
military intervention in Jul. 2013. However, the coefficient of the dummy 
for the Syrian event is negative and for the dummy of the Egyptian event is 
positive, while both are significant. While the Syrian conflict lessened herd 
behavior, the Egyptian event amplified herding oscillations. The net effect 
of the two impacts was to create a mild pattern of adverse herding.i In con-
trast, the reason for insignificant coefficients of dummies for Qatar may be 
explained by weaker trade and financial connections with Egypt and Syria, 
as well as by a policy that kept the Qatar market away from these regional 
events intentionally.
Finally, while we observe no effect on herding in Qatar from the global and 
region-specific events, its herding is found to be significantly associated with 
oil market fundamentals. The coefficients of oil returns and return volatility 
on herding in Qatar (a net exporter of oil) are both highly significant and carry 
negative signs. They both dampen the swings of the herding path but cause no 
adverse herding. This finding is again in line with some of the previous studies 
that volatility in oil prices (returns), as a major source of risk, affects herding 
(Balcilar et al., 2013b; Demirer and Ulussever, 2011).
In conclusion, based on the findings of the regression, it seems that investors 
in the Qatar market were more prepared to shocks, perhaps due to better access 
to market information about the global crisis and the fact that they were kept 
away from information about region-specific events intentionally, as a result 
of which sentimental herding was not found in association with any of those 
events. Qatar investors/traders in the stock market appear to be more concerned 
about what is happening in the oil market. In contrast, the herding of investors/
traders in Kuwait was guided by the mortgage crisis and region-specific events, 
rather than by the dynamics in the oil market.
i. Coincidently, the phenomenon of adverse herding with more or less the same pattern and timing 
was also observed in the BIST market of Turkey, a close neighbor of Syria (Demir et al., 2014).
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4 CONCLUSIONS
In this study we looked for sentimental herding (ie, beta herding) in four Mid-
dle Eastern frontier stock markets—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman—using 
the state–space model proposed by Hwang and Salmon (2004). We also looked 
for the impact on herding from global economic events—the mortgage crisis 
and oil returns—and region-specific political events—the Syrian Civil War and 
the Egyptian military intervention. Beta herding was revealed in Kuwait and 
Qatar but not in Bahrain and Oman. It appears that the driving forces for sen-
timental herding in the region are due to factors other than market category, as 
two of the frontier markets revealed herding while the other two, classified as 
frontier, did not. From the herding persistency parameter (m), we saw that it 
took much less time for Qatar herders to go back to a risk–return equilibrium 
(where hmt = 0) once the market is clear in terms of its direction than those in 
Kuwait. This may be explained by better market transparency and investors/
traders who quickly respond to fundamentals, as they are cognizant of incom-
ing market news. Market return volatility was highly significant with positive 
signs in markets in which herding was revealed, signaling that the resulting 
herding was not spurious in either market. On the contrary, herding was still 
significant in the AR(1) process, even with the presence of variables standing 
for market movements.
The mortgage crisis was highly significant in herding scores for Kuwait 
but not in those for Qatar, which can be explained by relatively more market 
transparency and intermarket connections in Qatar. Contrary to expectations, 
the impact of the Syrian Civil War and the military intervention in Egypt were 
limited in the Kuwait market. Interestingly, oil returns and oil return volatility 
appeared to impact herding behavior only in the Qatar market and not in the 
Kuwait market.
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